PHILOSOPHICAL COUNSELLINGBASED ON DIALOGICAL CRITICAL THINKING

In philosophical counselling, just as in all other kinds of client-centred work, a wide variety of approaches and methods are employed. That is not necessarily a bad thing, for each counsellor is then able to work in a way that suits him or her and can fully assess and adjust it so that it becomes more effective and superior. This is logical given that the approaches to counselling are entirely influenced by the various perceptions of philosophy, itself based on a variety of premises, which manifest themselves in different forms and lead to them being put into practice in different ways and shapes. In philosophical counselling there are two main trends: one the one hand there is a tendency to employ contemplative methods2 and on the other there is a tendency to begin from a critical thinking perspective. Our approach is similar to that grounded in dialogical critical thinking.

As S. C. Schuster (1999a, 38) has stated, the approach adopted by G. Achenbach, the founder of the modern philosophical counselling movement, is “sceptical and critical”, like a “modern Socratic ‘midwife’ encourag[ing] visitors to ‘give birth’ to philosophical insights into the problematic and complex issues of life”. Socrates is often referred to as a midwife and philosophical practitioner in the literature on philosophical counselling. As J. Delnoij points out, though, this is no imitation of Platonic Socratic dialogue. What is truly Socratic is the precise investigation of the thinking, concepts and values that we put into practice (Delnoij 1999, 52). R. Fisher (2005) states that Socratic questions3 help focus us on ideas or concepts as fundamental components of thinking

L. B. Amir (2006) states that the primary goal of philosophical counselling is to dispel confusion (false clarity or erroneous evidence) during discussion of key concepts relating to the good life, values and meanings. Some questions are more abstract while others are more personal. Abstract thinking as an active space in which thought and freedom can be expanded without the tyranny of personal fear is, according to Amir, one of the great therapeutic inventions of philosophy. The aim of philosophical counselling is to clarify thought or minimise confusion (through detecting suppositions, correcting faulty inferences and so forth). It is also to seek out options and extend perspectives (through alternative answers; references to books and philosophical systems of thought). Furthermore philosophical counselling should strengthen autonomy and responsibility and provide tools for future independent access to philosophy. It is therefore about encouraging abstract thinking, moving from actual experience to abstract thought and back. It is a process that promotes intellectual virtues with the end goal of deepening intellectual courage and autonomy. Intellectual virtues are precisely what philosophy is about. The system of asking and answering questions can be seen as one of “intelligent development”, which is linked to the capacity of accepting additional or differing opinions. Adopting different points of view and other epistemological virtues, such as impartiality or openness to the thinking of others, critically evaluating different replies, intellectual moderation, accepting only that for which there is evidence and the whole process of philosophical practice, faithful to philosophy, all develop intellectual courage, stamina and determination. By means of intellectual virtues which result in an understanding of different viewpoints, this process also brings forth moral virtues, such as pluralism, tolerance and solidarity towards others.

This belief that a sensible path leads to moral behaviour was one upheld by Socrates as well. Wollner (2010) states that Plato’s and Xenophon’s Socrates considered the path sensible providing it would enable the individual to act in a truly good and moral fashion. This is because people act well only when they have good guidance, if not they act wrongly. It is equally important to be able to avoid things that are wrong; knowing what is wrong again requires reason. Thinking is therefore an act through which a person achieves self-knowledge and thereby shapes him/herself. We can refer to this standpoint as strong intellectualism.

According to L. B. Amir, one of the important missions of philosophical counselling derives from the definition of autonomy in the sense of relying on one’s own powers in selecting and shaping viewpoints. The concept of autonomy is closely linked to courage and also humility, indicating a connection between the cognitive and volitional processes. These presuppose an intellectual ability to assess whether someone can evaluate better than we and an ability to control emotion. Gaining greater autonomy helps the client minimise the tension between freedom and equality, the ultimate goal of democratic philosophical practice (Amir 2006).

D. Boele (1999) has analysed the concept of “experience” in relation to philosophical counselling. He explains that philosophical counselling is not primarily concerned with how to resolve problems but with experience which, in addition to being a source of practical wisdom and something we can learn from, is a means of testing hypotheses and concepts. Socratic questions trigger experiences relating to our suppositions, values and ideas, which we largely experience subconsciously. Philosophising is one way in which we can become aware of them and draw attention to them. It is only once we are aware of these values and ideas that they can enter life as guiding concepts for life and the art of living, thus helping enhance the quality of life. “It is about updating those values and ideas that make life more valuable” (ibid., 9). Philosophising is therefore directed at values and ideas, since this approach benefits quality of life.

J. A. Tuedio (1998) stresses that philosophical counsellors can facilitate the client’s philosophical thinking by entering into a philosophical dialogue on life—the world, which then reveals the impact abstract concepts have on the client’s perception of everyday life. In this respect philosophical advisory services are like a window through which we look at how abstract reality manifests itself in clients’ life experiences. Tuedio states that philosophical counsellors should attempt to help their clients identify and reconstruct “dysfunctional” goals, images, values, feelings or beliefs through critical thinking and thus help them reconstruct dysfunctional perceptions in their world views, thus renewing the natural flow of their lives. The majority of people who seek out philosophical counselling come in search of new perspectives of their life or new insights into their lives. The philosopher should help them consider the meanings, directions and perspectives shaping their lives so they can learn to live with who they are and adapt in the process of becoming themselves.

Ideas and the relationships between concepts play an influential role in the processes of human life. Philosophical advisory services can assist those who require conceptual clarity in their lives so that this assistance facilitates a genuine “awakening” in the client. This is achieved through reflexive analysis aimed at opening up a conceptual space where clients can analyse, ask questions and locate the conceptual anchorage of their experiences and where they can adjust the narrative construction of their life histories in response to participating in a disciplined dialogical encounter. Tuedio cites Achenbach, who refers to this, saying that the philosopher’s task is to help the client find a conceptual voice allowing him/her to begin the process of restructuring the key elements of their diachronic subjectivity. By asking the right questions the counsellor can effectively facilitate this process of becoming oneself. Along the way, the client is required to focus attention, shifting from a particular absorption in the specific forms of their life concerns towards clarification of the abstract conceptual background that their life fears originate from (ibid., 5).

According to Tuedio there are two main objectives in conducting reflexive analysis. On the one hand the role of the philosopher is to prompt reflective awareness of the client’s history and help reveal the impact it has on his/her interpretative paradigm. This should help the client begin to see how these paradigms influence the way in which his or her life values and beliefs are shaped. The other objective that can be achieved through effective philosophical dialogue is to help the client recognise and correct non-functioning aspects of his/her life-directing conceptions, if they create dysfunctional feelings. The philosophical counsellor can facilitate the client’s exploratory analysis of what lies beyond the interpretative paradigms, which should thereby strengthen them. It is, however, important that the philosophical counselling is only conducted to resolve “abstract” life concerns through philosophical dialogue. Even if the client focuses the dialogue on specific questions in his or her life, it is useful to engage him or her in reflexive analysis of the potentially nonfunctioning aspects of his or her perceptions of life. P. A. Facione (2004) analysed the findings of a panel of experts established in 1990 in order to reach a consensus on what ideal critical thinking is. He stated that “the ideal critical thinker” is defined not only in terms of his or her cognitive skills, but also through his or her approach to life and living generally (Facione 2004, 8). Approaches to life and living which characterise critical thinking include:

• inquisitiveness with regard to a wide range of issues,

• concern to become and remain well-informed,

• alertness to opportunities to use critical thinking,

• trust in the processes of reasoned inquiry,

• self-confidence in one’s own abilities to reason,

• open-mindedness regarding divergent world views,

• flexibility in considering alternatives and opinions,

• understanding the opinions of other people,

• fair-mindedness in appraising reasoning,

• honesty in facing one’s own biases, prejudices, stereotypes, or egocentric tendencies,

• prudence in suspending, making or altering judgments,

• willingness to reconsider and revise views where honest reflection suggests that change is warranted (ibid.).

Facione also points out that critical thinking can be reflective; it is said that there is a reflective system of thinking. Founded on reason and evidence, this system is based on what we have learnt through analysis, evaluation, explanation, and self-correction. It is a system which values intellectual honesty, analytical prediction of what will occur next, eliminating mistakes and seeking the truth. It involves careful consideration of the nature and causes of our problems (ibid., 1).

R. Fisher (2005) says that during the last century Socratic dialogue again became part of the European tradition, inspired by the work of L. Nelson, his student G. Heckmann and philosophers trained in this method, mainly from Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands, later extending to Britain and eventually the US. For Nelson the power of the Socratic method lies in the fact that it “forces the mind to freedom”. Only continual pressure to say what we think and to meet counter-questions and to give reasons for every statement transforms the power that creates an “irresistible compulsion”. The consultant’s aim is to help clients find answers to their, originally implicit, questions and through dialogue to enable participants to express their thoughts clearly, to systematise their judgements and test their beliefs against the arguments and opinions of others. The consultant’s role is to ask questions. The aim is to obtain some kind of consensus or agreement among all participants. Fisher states that Socratic questions and challenging dialogue help us to focus on the ideas or concepts as the basic components of thinking. All ideas or elicited questions should be considered as potential sources of truth. These questions encourage a deeper insight into everyday experiences and enable us to explore the wonder and mystery we find there. The questions force us to dig deep and consider the concepts that structure our reflections on the world.

T. Curnow (1999) suggests that since antiquity opinions on those involved in dialogue have been conceived of in two fundamental ways. In the first sense, dialogue is seen as the opposite of a monologue; thus, it is a friendly conversation that participants share and engage in. Curnow attributes this position to Plato. The second sense involves a Socratic approach, since (according to Plato in The Apology) he often accused his fellow debaters of shortcomings thus making an enemy of himself, which finally ended in his death. By contrast in Nelson’s modern Socratic dialogue, consensus has a very important role to play (ibid., 47). The discussions that unfold within them not only encourage consideration of individual experiences but also a consensual exchange of ideas (notions). Consensus is both an extremely important and essential step. And since consensus is essential, progress is slow, for differences in opinion cannot be ignored or considered meaningless (ibid., 47-48).4

Nonetheless, as Schuster stresses, Nelson’s method, which modern Socratic dialogue has evolved from, is “critical”. She adds that Nelson’s Socratic dialogue can be considered to be a neo-Socratic approach in that responses are verified within the group of participants, whereas in Achenbach’s conception of Socratic dialogue, verification occurs in different ways (Schuster 1999a, 60). Philosophising through Socratic dialogue can be conducted either in groups or individually. In both cases, however, counsellors prefer to adopt a non-direct and empathetic approach to visitors or clients, which is G. Achenbach’s position. Likewise Schuster believes the philosophical counsellor should approach philosophising on the basis of his or her own experiences and discuss the problem with the client using “empathy” (Schuster 1999a, 33).

Chamberlain also explains her approach to philosophical counselling in terms of Socratic questioning. She refers to empathy as well but in a different way. She suggests that counsellors should guide their clients towards an empathetic attitude. During critical dialogical thinking the clients should acquire not only skills of reasoning and logic but also the skill of being able to enter the world of experiences through acknowledging the experiences and emotions of others, practising empathy. This skill involves the intellectual ability to perceive emotions, thoughts and ideals. Our human capacity for empathy lies at the heart of all moral and social responsibility. Generally, understanding and feeling compassion do not mean “accepting” a situation. However, their nature is such that, regardless of the result, there will be less antagonism, hostility and guilt in the relationships between the participants, and opportunities for consensus and common action will increase. By engaging in “seeing”, “thinking” and “feeling” from the perspective of others, empathy becomes the guiding spirit in developing compassion, working together and coming together despite differences (Chamberlain 1999, 40-41). Practising empathy is not only rewarding for the client but is also necessary, since it can lead to improved interpersonal relations at home, at work or while involved in essential activities, both locally and globally. Empathy and compassion can provide scope for new thoughts and emotions. In this way they increase opportunities for innovative ways of life (ibid., 41).

According to Schuster (1999a, 1999b) attitudes to the client in philosophical counselling have much in common with Buber’s I-Thou relationship, which is seen as an encounter. She states that: Achenbach’s ‘beyond-method’ dialogue is in many aspects similar to Buber’s I-Thou relationship. Buber believes there is an I-Thou relationship in every genuine encounters. In philosophical counselling, as seen in the therapies inspired by Buber (for example Rogers’ person-centred approach), the genuineness of the encounter is very important (Schuster 1999b).

The basic elements comprising Buber’s understanding of reality in his I and Thou (1995) are the pairs I-Thou and I-It. They relate to two attitudes we can adopt in relation to our environment. Through I-It we look at the world in terms of experiences, while through IThou we enter into a world of relationships. We view things as one, as our Thou. During an encounter one person becomes an authentic I and the second an authentic Thou.

Rogers describes therapy5 as a “process of becoming ourselves”, which occurs as a single experience, submerged in understanding with the therapist. He states that what occurs “in these moments, to borrow Buber’s phrase, [is] a real ‘I-Thou’ relationship, a timeless living in the experience which is between the client and me” (Rogers 1995, 166). In becoming ourselves we deeply experience personal choice. We are aware that we can decide whether to continue hiding behind a ‘façade’ or whether to take the risk involved in being oneself. We feel that it is in our power to destroy someone else or ourselves and equally that we can rise above ourselves and others. Given this, we decide to remain ourselves, opening up a new way of life in which emotions are experienced in greater depth and extent. Rogers again turns to Buber in explaining that in this relationship we “confirm the other” (which means accepting him or her in all his or her potential, recognising the person within, created in order to become, thus confirming that he or she can develop and evolve), accepting him or her as being. The relationship should therefore be seen as an opportunity to “strengthen” everything that person is, with all his or her potential and abilities. “I have then—to use Buber’s term—confirmed him as a living person capable of creative inner development” (Rogers 2000, 56). This process can be seen as a kind of learning achieved not through symbols but through experiencing.6 Therefore the counsellor must not directly “teach the client” for that would destroy the client’s own discovery; this kind of learning cannot be forced (Rogers 1997, 68).

T. LeBon (1999) refers to C. R. Rogers’ three basic conditions for effective counselling: an authentic, unconditional and empathetic approach. In this respect he analyses Socrates’ approach and concludes that it does not fulfil any of Rogers’ conditions; he was concerned with the truth and not the client’s peace of mind. On one hand, then, philosophical counselling is an attempt to understand the ideas and world views associated with the client’s portrayal of life problems, which requires a feeling of mental peace. On the other hand, it is derived from Socratic methods and seeks a critical approach to the client attempting to build on truthful foundations. According to LeBon philosophical counselling must therefore contain two non-conflicting elements: truth and a feeling of mental peace.

Developing philosophical counselling on the basis of critical thinking presupposes critical philosophical dialogue between counsellor and client, hence, as the Slovak philosopher, Ján Šulavík, has stated, it concerns the relationship between an expert and a lay person. Šulavík describes how the relationship between expert and lay philosophy has taken on different forms in the history of philosophical thought (Šulavík 2001, 175-183).8 In the Socratic model the philosopher and lay person hold a dialogue in which they clarify their views on the matter and, through inductive comparison and definition, create a concept and overview of the facts together. The fundamental assumption in applying Socrates’ philosophy professionally is that the lay person wishes to listen to the questions and converse with the philosopher. The constituent element in this relationship is not therefore the philosopher as expert, but the lay person as target and audience. If the lay public does not listen, the philosopher cannot act and no relationship arises between expert and lay person. Socratic motivation for philosophical discussion requires an awareness of one’s lack of knowledge (I know that I know nothing). Those who are sceptical of general awareness are at the beginning of the philosophical process of reflecting and discovery. Socrates’ fellow citizens were insufficiently aware of their own lack of awareness. They did not know “why they lived as they did”; their way of life was not the result of conscious choice. If they acted wrongly, they were unaware of it. If they were to do good, they would first have had to realise their lack of awareness. By posing his questions, often ironic in tone, Socrates cast doubt on the ordinary certainties of the lives of his fellow citizens, making fun of their lay philosophy and value systems. In the Stilpo model philosophy becomes an esoteric experience and is not aimed at a lay audience.

In the Plato model the philosopher is the most competent expert on matters concerning citizen behaviour and the management of the state. Plato is sceptical towards philosophically educated lay people and believes that it is best for lay people to find an expert to resolve their life problems. Their relationship is analogous to that of the producer and consumer. In this case the lay person is simply the consumer of the finished product.

In keeping with the ideals of the enlightenment Fichte watered down Plato’s model of philosopher/ruler. The relationship between philosopher (intellectual) and ruler (politician) is seen more in terms of collaboration among experts on a particular “project”, where every person has a clearly defined sphere of responsibility. The task of the philosopher is to formulate ideas and the enlightenment ruler is to implement them, that is, to govern society in accordance with them. Fichtean philosophic expertise can be ranked as a more moderate version of Plato’s model, since the enlightenment expert philosopher is not interested in the “lay philosophy” regent or one might even surmise that he or she has no philosophy befitting the name.

While Platonic and Fichtean philosophers built their authority and power upon their expertise, Edward Said’s postmodern intellectual fought against precisely this kind of power: his leadership no longer legitimises his right to power and to manipulate those who know “less” than he does. Postmodern liberals also raise objections to the enlightenment ideal of the scholar, which has evolved since Plato’s “philosopher/ruler”. They do not acknowledge the expert’s right to “represent” the lay person. Said emphasises the concept of “amateur” (from “ama”—to love) or “amateur intellectual”. The meaning of the term philosophy has become looser and has expanded to include philosophy created by individuals as their “life philosophy”, (perhaps with the help of an expert—a philosopher). The lay person is no passive consumer of a certain “optimal philosophy” but through his or her own “philosophising” shapes and tailors the philosophy to fit. While philosophising the philosopher adopts the role not of “producer” of philosophy but of “adviser” (consultant) during the act of philosophising. In this case the distance between expert and lay person shrinks. It is therefore supposed that people generally have need of philosophy or philosophising and that ultimately they have to create and reflect upon their philosophy themselves. This does not mean that they cannot turn to a professional philosopher as well for a proposed “finished product”. This model enhances the lay person’s “philosophical credit”. According to Šulavík, the various types of philosophical expertise are also linked through different conceptions of philosophy, which fluctuate from broader to narrower definitions. While the Platonic model associates philosophy with professional philosophy, the postmodern one also includes the lay version. Therefore there is no impermeable boundary between expert philosophy and lay philosophy, but rather they intersect freely.

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